But better late then never.
So I've been watching Battlestar Gallactica now for about 3 weeks and have just begun Season 2.5.
I will admit, I found the show a bit slow to start off. But where I am now, watching it in the context of the show in its entirety, I'm sure I will feel differently about that when I start the series all over again one day.
Anyways, the show is interesting because it asks questions that shows usually refuse to ask. They don't ask them because they fear that the ratings will be low. And, in a certain sense, that's probably true.
The beauty of Science Fiction, the undeniable quality it has that is lacking from any big time show is precisely the fact that it can ask the tough questions, those that are the most important and central to who we are as human beings.
The interesting thing is that the show does not attempt to just throw the questions out there. It is not some intense philosophical discussion with no plot. Rather, it does things in the manner that I know J.R.R. Tolkien would approve of. They do it in the form of myth, of, if you will, a space fairy tale. It asks the important questions, but in a way that it is central to the story as a whole. These questions do not force themselves into the plot line, but rather, they are weaved in a way that they are essential for the plot line to move on.
There are many interesting questions the show raises. Are Cylons people? Can Cylons love? There are many others as well. But the most important, and definitely the most human one, is the one that gets to the core of our humanity. It seems that the Cylons attempted to destroy mankind because they felt that they were not deserving to live. They kill each other, and, well, if you can name a bad act, man does it. They don't seem deserving of life.
So, in my opinion, the central question of the show is "what makes humanity worthy of life". After watching Resurrection Pt. 2, I think I have come to the answer. And it came with such a simple, and yet profound, display of humanity. Adama, shaken up by the death of Admiral Kane, knowing that it was almost him who ordered her death, ends it all with a kiss with President Roslin. The range of emotions is truly remarkable.
But what finally hit it for me, what finally got me the answer was that very display. What makes man worth of life is that which makes him man! Humanity is worthy of life precisely because it's human. Or, as the quotable Del Myers puts it much more precisely "Man is worthy of redemption because he is capable of it". Our strength, our weakness, the wholeness of what makes us human, that is what makes us worthy of life. We are worthy to walk this Earth precisely because of our mistakes and triumphs.
To me, that is an utterly Christian outlook of the world, because it is the core of the message. Christ comes to redeem, but He cannot redeem those who feel they have nothing to redeem. That is the trait that is different between man and they Cylons. Man is able to make mistakes, but the Cylons refuse to. Number 6 would not kill herself because it was a sin. She refused to accept her weakness. That is the true weakness, when we are unable to accept our weakness, for it is only when we accept our weakness are we able to be made strong in Christ.
-Harrison
Showing posts with label Philosophy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Philosophy. Show all posts
Friday, April 04, 2008
Sunday, January 13, 2008
Nominalism - The Source of Man's Degradation?
I remember talking about this with a friend one evening and I came to some interesting conclusions that had honestly never crossed my mind before.
Many people see the degradation of man with the philosophy of Descartes. Indeed, Descartes' dualistic leanings give rise to many problems about the state of knowledge, man's experience, and thus man's attaining of knowledge.
But at least universals still exist in Descartes mind.
I think the problem is in nominalism.
Nominalism states that there is no such thing as universals, but that there are only particulars which have similarities for which we construct universal concepts for the sake of simplifying the world. In reality, however, according to the nominalist, these universals are just constructs and do not actually exist.
Why is this a problem?
I see it as a problem because it denies that which individuates man from the rest of the animals.
Man is different because he can abstract things. When we see a cup, we see not only the cup, but we are able to grasp its essence in our mind. Animals, on the other hand, are never able to go past the particular. They may be able to have the experience of a cup, but they can never know cupness, that is, the essence of what makes a cup a cup.
With nominalism, we fall into the trap of denying the theory of abstraction in which hinges man's distinguishing factor.
We thus fall into a degradation that is contrary to our nature. Why do you think relativism has come about? It has come about because we no longer believe we are able to have abstract concepts when in reality they are at the center of our life, we experience abstraction at every moment of the day.
If we are to just give a name to a particular, then we have this notion of the inability to abstract. We thus become like the rest of the animals and see things for their purely physical nature and deny the metaphysical aspect of things, which we call materialism, which is the root of consumerism and all other isms that are destroying society today.
Some people say sometimes "what's the point of discussing theories of the past?" We see here, however, that Nominalism, which is a theory from about the 12th century onwards, has had drastic implications that has denied everything in which we experience. We must equip ourselves so we can engage others to bring them to the beauty, splendor, and wonder of truth.
-Harrison
Many people see the degradation of man with the philosophy of Descartes. Indeed, Descartes' dualistic leanings give rise to many problems about the state of knowledge, man's experience, and thus man's attaining of knowledge.
But at least universals still exist in Descartes mind.
I think the problem is in nominalism.
Nominalism states that there is no such thing as universals, but that there are only particulars which have similarities for which we construct universal concepts for the sake of simplifying the world. In reality, however, according to the nominalist, these universals are just constructs and do not actually exist.
Why is this a problem?
I see it as a problem because it denies that which individuates man from the rest of the animals.
Man is different because he can abstract things. When we see a cup, we see not only the cup, but we are able to grasp its essence in our mind. Animals, on the other hand, are never able to go past the particular. They may be able to have the experience of a cup, but they can never know cupness, that is, the essence of what makes a cup a cup.
With nominalism, we fall into the trap of denying the theory of abstraction in which hinges man's distinguishing factor.
We thus fall into a degradation that is contrary to our nature. Why do you think relativism has come about? It has come about because we no longer believe we are able to have abstract concepts when in reality they are at the center of our life, we experience abstraction at every moment of the day.
If we are to just give a name to a particular, then we have this notion of the inability to abstract. We thus become like the rest of the animals and see things for their purely physical nature and deny the metaphysical aspect of things, which we call materialism, which is the root of consumerism and all other isms that are destroying society today.
Some people say sometimes "what's the point of discussing theories of the past?" We see here, however, that Nominalism, which is a theory from about the 12th century onwards, has had drastic implications that has denied everything in which we experience. We must equip ourselves so we can engage others to bring them to the beauty, splendor, and wonder of truth.
-Harrison
Tuesday, December 11, 2007
Can The Past Be Infinite?
I had an interesting conversation about the nature of time today with a friend. I also just saw a post on a blog about the possibility of the infinite nature of time. This got me thinking about things a bit, and so I would like to do a bit of philosophical exercise which may stride on into a theological exercise.
Definition of Terms
Infinite - When I use the term infinite, I use it in the Aristotelian sense. Now, Aristotle uses two possible ways in which the infinite can exist, as a potential and as an actual. Aristotle argues that an actual infinite cannot exist, but this shall not be dealt with here. My concern is with the potential infinite. A potential infinite is said to be something that is measurable, but is unable to get to the end or beginning, or both, of a set.
For example. Let us take a number set between 1 and 10. Everything within that finite set of numbers (1 and 10) is infinitely divisible. It is not possible to reach a limit in divisibility. No matter how hard you try, it will never get to an end. Once you are "within the set", it can be potentially impossible to get to the end, for there is a potentially infinite series of numbers that one would have to "cross" in order to get to one. A potential infinite is also measurable, no matter how small it is.
Time - That which is the current state of reality in the present.
Discussion
St Augustine famously said "if you ask me what time is, I don't know what it is, but if you don't ask me, then I know". He is also famous for his discourse on time. He states that the past and the future are not real, for they no longer are in existence, but have ceased to be, or have not come to be. The only time that exists is the current moment. This leads to a very interesting view of reality itself, but I shall not get into it.
My question, though, is whether or not the past can be infinite in a potential manner. If Augustine is right and it no longer exists, then the question is pointless to ask for it makes no sense to talk about a reality that is no longer in existence.
However, and this is where philosophy and theology tango, Christ brings an interesting perspective into the idea of time. The infinite (in an actual and real sense, not in a potential sense) comes into contact with the finite, all in the Incarnation. As Ratzinger says, time and eternity are united. If this is the case, that eternity and time come into one contact, then it brings a sense of the eternal into the temporal world and a sense of the temporal world into eternity. This is a logical implication of the Incarnation.
Now, that means that each moment of existence, because of the Incarnation, is touched by the eternal and so, in a certain sense, is grafted to eternity to become an ever present reality. Thus, and I hate to say this, I think Augustine is wrong in his understanding of time because of the understanding of the Incarnation. I would like to point out that I am not giving a complete description of how time and eternity (that is, all instances of time) become eternal because that involves a much deeper understanding of the Incarnation that I wish not to get into at the moment.
My point is, though, that the past takes an a certain eternal character, which means it exists forever, as an everlasting moment, just as every moment in time, because of the fact that eternity and itself have been grafted to each other. Now, this gets me into the nature of the past as at least potentially infinite.
Taking my example from the definition earlier of a finite set that has infinite divisibility, I can apply this to time. Let us say that the set of the past is the total moments from the first instance in time to the present moment. If we look within that set, there is an infinitude of moments in which we can examine, breaking them down more and more into more minute moments. Thus, since the past is nothing more then a finite set of moments, and a potential infinite can be examined within that set, it makes sense to say that the past is, in a certain sense, infinite in the order of potentiality.
-Harrison
Definition of Terms
Infinite - When I use the term infinite, I use it in the Aristotelian sense. Now, Aristotle uses two possible ways in which the infinite can exist, as a potential and as an actual. Aristotle argues that an actual infinite cannot exist, but this shall not be dealt with here. My concern is with the potential infinite. A potential infinite is said to be something that is measurable, but is unable to get to the end or beginning, or both, of a set.
For example. Let us take a number set between 1 and 10. Everything within that finite set of numbers (1 and 10) is infinitely divisible. It is not possible to reach a limit in divisibility. No matter how hard you try, it will never get to an end. Once you are "within the set", it can be potentially impossible to get to the end, for there is a potentially infinite series of numbers that one would have to "cross" in order to get to one. A potential infinite is also measurable, no matter how small it is.
Time - That which is the current state of reality in the present.
Discussion
St Augustine famously said "if you ask me what time is, I don't know what it is, but if you don't ask me, then I know". He is also famous for his discourse on time. He states that the past and the future are not real, for they no longer are in existence, but have ceased to be, or have not come to be. The only time that exists is the current moment. This leads to a very interesting view of reality itself, but I shall not get into it.
My question, though, is whether or not the past can be infinite in a potential manner. If Augustine is right and it no longer exists, then the question is pointless to ask for it makes no sense to talk about a reality that is no longer in existence.
However, and this is where philosophy and theology tango, Christ brings an interesting perspective into the idea of time. The infinite (in an actual and real sense, not in a potential sense) comes into contact with the finite, all in the Incarnation. As Ratzinger says, time and eternity are united. If this is the case, that eternity and time come into one contact, then it brings a sense of the eternal into the temporal world and a sense of the temporal world into eternity. This is a logical implication of the Incarnation.
Now, that means that each moment of existence, because of the Incarnation, is touched by the eternal and so, in a certain sense, is grafted to eternity to become an ever present reality. Thus, and I hate to say this, I think Augustine is wrong in his understanding of time because of the understanding of the Incarnation. I would like to point out that I am not giving a complete description of how time and eternity (that is, all instances of time) become eternal because that involves a much deeper understanding of the Incarnation that I wish not to get into at the moment.
My point is, though, that the past takes an a certain eternal character, which means it exists forever, as an everlasting moment, just as every moment in time, because of the fact that eternity and itself have been grafted to each other. Now, this gets me into the nature of the past as at least potentially infinite.
Taking my example from the definition earlier of a finite set that has infinite divisibility, I can apply this to time. Let us say that the set of the past is the total moments from the first instance in time to the present moment. If we look within that set, there is an infinitude of moments in which we can examine, breaking them down more and more into more minute moments. Thus, since the past is nothing more then a finite set of moments, and a potential infinite can be examined within that set, it makes sense to say that the past is, in a certain sense, infinite in the order of potentiality.
-Harrison
Sunday, December 02, 2007
Philosophical Geek Out!
I am currently in the process of reading Aquinas' commentary on Aristotle's metaphysics. It is really an amazing piece of work and the fruit of much thinking!
I am currently on Book V, Lesson 2, in which the discussion on causation happens.
For those that don't know, there are 4 causal modes in Aristotle's Metaphysics within 2 types of causation.
The 2 types are:
1) Intrinsic Causation - That which is generated from within (will give examples of this in a bit).
2) Extrinsic Causation - That which is generated from without (will, again, give examples of this in a bit).
Within Intrinsic Causation there are 2 modes of this type that can be called causes:
1.a) Material Cause - That which gives the matter for a thing to be. For example, a bronze statue has as its material cause bronze. The bronze does not come from without the bronze, but is part of the statue itself. Therefore it is intrinsic.
1.b) Formal Cause (Sidenote, this cause is both an intrinsic and extrinsic cause). That which gives a thing the form necessary for it to be what it is. For example, the form of a statue is from within. The form is that which gives "definition" to the matter, to make the matter knowable to the intellect.
Within Extrinsic Causation there are 3 mods of this type that can be called causes:
2.a) Formal Cause - When a thing is made in the likeness of another thing and thus receives its form from that thing though it cannot be that thing. This type of formal cause is of the imitative sort. To bring us back to our statue example, though within it it has the form of statue, and, let us say, it is made to resemble John Paul II, it receives the form of "John Paul II" from John Paul II, who is exterior to the statue and thus a cause for it to be a resemblance of him.
2.b) Efficient Cause - That which brings a thing to movement or rest. For example to throw a ball is to be the efficient cause of the ball, for its accidental properties (such as placement and movement) are changing. The catcher of the ball is also an efficient cause because he is again changing the accidental properties of the ball and bringing it to rest. In another sense, Efficient Cause is that which brings a thing into being, which involves motion.
There are 4 types of the type "Efficient Cause" which Aquinas gets from Avicenna; Perfective, Dispositive, Auxiliary, and Advisory. I will not go into that for now, but the distinctions truly blow the mind away!
3.b) Final Cause - That which is the sake for why a thing is done. To bring us back to the example of the ball, the ball is thrown in order for the other person to catch it. Thus, the final cause of the ball in that action is to be caught.
Now, within Final Causation, there are 2 distinctions; ultimate end and intermediary end. This is the reason for why I posted this post. The ultimate cause is the ultimate "raison d'etre" for a thing to act. Aquinas would say that the ultimate final cause of man is to spend eternity in loving communion with God. But intermediary final causes are things that are necessary in order for the final end, the ultimate final cause, to happen.
Now, to bring it back to the ball example, it would seem to me that Aristotle and Aquinas (if I recall correctly) would argue that intermediary final causes are infinite in nature.
Let me give you an example from Math. Let us say we have the numeric distance between 1 and 2. Between that finite set is an infinite possibility of division. One could never move past 1 to 2, for they could continually go further and further down the decimal scale.
The same in our ball example. When someone throws a ball, the ultimate end is for the other to catch it. But in order for that to happen, there must be an infinite set of motions within the finite set of the throw and the catch.
This would seem to make sense since Aristotle argued that the universe is what he calls a potential infinite. It is measurable, yet without any seeming point to measure. If we went within the set of numbers between 1 and 2, we could say the same, as if there were no beginning or end, though there is, but from within the set, it would be impossible.
It is interesting how this seems to logically follow from Aristotle's theory of the 4 causes and how this shows up within his discussions later on in regards to the infinite.
-Harrison
I am currently on Book V, Lesson 2, in which the discussion on causation happens.
For those that don't know, there are 4 causal modes in Aristotle's Metaphysics within 2 types of causation.
The 2 types are:
1) Intrinsic Causation - That which is generated from within (will give examples of this in a bit).
2) Extrinsic Causation - That which is generated from without (will, again, give examples of this in a bit).
Within Intrinsic Causation there are 2 modes of this type that can be called causes:
1.a) Material Cause - That which gives the matter for a thing to be. For example, a bronze statue has as its material cause bronze. The bronze does not come from without the bronze, but is part of the statue itself. Therefore it is intrinsic.
1.b) Formal Cause (Sidenote, this cause is both an intrinsic and extrinsic cause). That which gives a thing the form necessary for it to be what it is. For example, the form of a statue is from within. The form is that which gives "definition" to the matter, to make the matter knowable to the intellect.
Within Extrinsic Causation there are 3 mods of this type that can be called causes:
2.a) Formal Cause - When a thing is made in the likeness of another thing and thus receives its form from that thing though it cannot be that thing. This type of formal cause is of the imitative sort. To bring us back to our statue example, though within it it has the form of statue, and, let us say, it is made to resemble John Paul II, it receives the form of "John Paul II" from John Paul II, who is exterior to the statue and thus a cause for it to be a resemblance of him.
2.b) Efficient Cause - That which brings a thing to movement or rest. For example to throw a ball is to be the efficient cause of the ball, for its accidental properties (such as placement and movement) are changing. The catcher of the ball is also an efficient cause because he is again changing the accidental properties of the ball and bringing it to rest. In another sense, Efficient Cause is that which brings a thing into being, which involves motion.
There are 4 types of the type "Efficient Cause" which Aquinas gets from Avicenna; Perfective, Dispositive, Auxiliary, and Advisory. I will not go into that for now, but the distinctions truly blow the mind away!
3.b) Final Cause - That which is the sake for why a thing is done. To bring us back to the example of the ball, the ball is thrown in order for the other person to catch it. Thus, the final cause of the ball in that action is to be caught.
Now, within Final Causation, there are 2 distinctions; ultimate end and intermediary end. This is the reason for why I posted this post. The ultimate cause is the ultimate "raison d'etre" for a thing to act. Aquinas would say that the ultimate final cause of man is to spend eternity in loving communion with God. But intermediary final causes are things that are necessary in order for the final end, the ultimate final cause, to happen.
Now, to bring it back to the ball example, it would seem to me that Aristotle and Aquinas (if I recall correctly) would argue that intermediary final causes are infinite in nature.
Let me give you an example from Math. Let us say we have the numeric distance between 1 and 2. Between that finite set is an infinite possibility of division. One could never move past 1 to 2, for they could continually go further and further down the decimal scale.
The same in our ball example. When someone throws a ball, the ultimate end is for the other to catch it. But in order for that to happen, there must be an infinite set of motions within the finite set of the throw and the catch.
This would seem to make sense since Aristotle argued that the universe is what he calls a potential infinite. It is measurable, yet without any seeming point to measure. If we went within the set of numbers between 1 and 2, we could say the same, as if there were no beginning or end, though there is, but from within the set, it would be impossible.
It is interesting how this seems to logically follow from Aristotle's theory of the 4 causes and how this shows up within his discussions later on in regards to the infinite.
-Harrison
Saturday, November 24, 2007
The Principle of Non-Contradiction
The Principle of Non-Contradiction is a philosophical principle that has been around for a long time. Essentially, it states that a certain claim is either true or false, it cannot be both at the same time. For example, a fire is either hot or it is not hot, it cannot be both for that goes against the nature of temperature.
I have been listening to a variety of Peter Kreeft lectures as of late and have found them fascinating. The particular reason I have found them fascinating is the extent to which he uses this philosophical principle and how the great arguments of the past have also used this to principle to make their case.
For example, take Pascal's Wager. In it Pascal gives us a reality. God either exists or does not exist. It is a logical impossibility for there to be both. Now, there are 4 possibilities from this Sic et Non.
1) God exists and you don't believe.
2) God exists and you do believe.
3) God doesn't exist and you don't believe.
4) God doesn't exist and you do believe.
Now, he says the following for each statement.
1) If God exists and you don't believe then you're in trouble because He has loved you and you have failed to return that love or to care for the fact that He exists. Bad move. You have not lived for that which you were created for.
2) Good on ya! You believed and live a life to follow Him and pursue Him passionately! This adds not only a tremendous value to your life, but to others as well. This gives your life purpose.
3) Well, you were right. But because God doesn't exist, there is no value to life anyways, so what good did it do to not believe?
4) Well, turns out you're wrong, but at least you were able to live a life that was worthy of helping others and loving them.
Now, Pascal never makes the claim that these are arguments for the existence of God. No, he says that this is simply the first step among many. But he is making a point in that, well, what does it hurt to believe? Will life be miserable because you believe in God?
Now, what interests me in this argument is the principle of non-contradiction. You take the principle of truth and falseness and see where it leads you. We see here the 4 possibilities of True and False and a decision to be made in regards to one's belief in God's existence.
Looking back now, this is essentially how the Medievals worked. Thomas Aquinas' Summa is built in this manner. He says that, for example, Theology is either a science or not a science. He shows the positions for both, and then gives you the reason for holding the true position. It is very common sensicle.
I think we have lost this principle in our lives because of skepticism. Instead of saying "the fire is either hot or not hot", we say "well, how do we know that this idea of temperature is not just a projection of our consciousness? How do I even know what temperature is, maybe it's just a social construct".
Essentially, this skepticism is bound to destroy Western Civilization and is the roots of our relativistic leanings in society.
Al-Ghazali, a Medieval Islamic philosopher, once said in regards to skeptics (for he was once one himself) "Throw a skeptic in a fire and tell them to tell you that the fire is not really fire and that the heat is not really burning their flesh". Experience, practicality, and common sense, always win in the end.
-Harrison
I have been listening to a variety of Peter Kreeft lectures as of late and have found them fascinating. The particular reason I have found them fascinating is the extent to which he uses this philosophical principle and how the great arguments of the past have also used this to principle to make their case.
For example, take Pascal's Wager. In it Pascal gives us a reality. God either exists or does not exist. It is a logical impossibility for there to be both. Now, there are 4 possibilities from this Sic et Non.
1) God exists and you don't believe.
2) God exists and you do believe.
3) God doesn't exist and you don't believe.
4) God doesn't exist and you do believe.
Now, he says the following for each statement.
1) If God exists and you don't believe then you're in trouble because He has loved you and you have failed to return that love or to care for the fact that He exists. Bad move. You have not lived for that which you were created for.
2) Good on ya! You believed and live a life to follow Him and pursue Him passionately! This adds not only a tremendous value to your life, but to others as well. This gives your life purpose.
3) Well, you were right. But because God doesn't exist, there is no value to life anyways, so what good did it do to not believe?
4) Well, turns out you're wrong, but at least you were able to live a life that was worthy of helping others and loving them.
Now, Pascal never makes the claim that these are arguments for the existence of God. No, he says that this is simply the first step among many. But he is making a point in that, well, what does it hurt to believe? Will life be miserable because you believe in God?
Now, what interests me in this argument is the principle of non-contradiction. You take the principle of truth and falseness and see where it leads you. We see here the 4 possibilities of True and False and a decision to be made in regards to one's belief in God's existence.
Looking back now, this is essentially how the Medievals worked. Thomas Aquinas' Summa is built in this manner. He says that, for example, Theology is either a science or not a science. He shows the positions for both, and then gives you the reason for holding the true position. It is very common sensicle.
I think we have lost this principle in our lives because of skepticism. Instead of saying "the fire is either hot or not hot", we say "well, how do we know that this idea of temperature is not just a projection of our consciousness? How do I even know what temperature is, maybe it's just a social construct".
Essentially, this skepticism is bound to destroy Western Civilization and is the roots of our relativistic leanings in society.
Al-Ghazali, a Medieval Islamic philosopher, once said in regards to skeptics (for he was once one himself) "Throw a skeptic in a fire and tell them to tell you that the fire is not really fire and that the heat is not really burning their flesh". Experience, practicality, and common sense, always win in the end.
-Harrison
Thursday, August 02, 2007
A Problem of Language?
I was having a discussion last night with my roomate. He was stating that he is going to be researching the history of the idea of a person, with concentration on the theologians of the East.
He was stating that this is a topic he's going to spend time on because of a problem in engaging the idea of person nowadays.
He stated that, when discussing the distinction between man and animals, the ability to distinguish between man and animals is lessening with an alarming rate. Why is this happening? Because of an overly emphasized empiricism. For example, people say that apes can have a sense of the idea of beauty because they stare longer at a piece of art that is beautiful then one that is ugly. Therefore, they exhibit a human characteristic and thus are not so different really, and perhaps they are indeed persons.
My roomate was arguing that we have focused too much on the idea that man is a rational being, and it is the gift of reason that distinguishes him from animals. I was completely honest with him in that I didn't agree. The problem was not the idea of man being reasonable and something that has been taking by animal behaviourilists and applied to animals. Reason is that which defines the individual. But the problem is not on the individual level, but on the level of species.
One thing that is not discussed is man as a social animal. Perhaps there has been an over-emphasis on man's individual isolation from the rest of the animal kingdom. This is why it is important to affirm mans's social aspect. This is why God said it is "not good" for man to be alone on the 6th day. This is quite strong language, considering God is constantly saying "behold, it is good". The first statement of value is that God says it is "not good". That should really stick out to anyone who reads the Bible. God saw Man as not being complete and so created a partner fitting for Adam. Man became fulfilled by being a society of persons. Then God not only said that it was good, but that is was "very good". This again should leave us food for contemplation, because it is the only time in the creation narrative that God says "very good". Man is only fulfilled by being a society of persons. Man, on the species sense, is fundamentally different from the individuals. The individuals are individuated from animals because of their ability to reason, but also to be social in a society.
This, of course, is the theological position. To bring in Genesis to the public square on the nature of animals would probably not go over too well. And so, I propose a second problem, a flight from metaphysics.
People in the modern world have taken the idea of science too far to the point that all certainty is in that which we observe through our senses. They divorece it from any idea of a universal principle, form, or what not. When you divorce metaphysics from empiricism, you divorce your ability to make your case convincingly on a universal basis. Metaphysics discuss those universals from which we derive our particulars.
And this is why I think JP II's Theology of the Body and Philosophical Anthropology are the tool to this modern epidemic. One is a theological language, exclusive to the Christian discussion and affirmation of Man, while the other is a philosophical language, based in truth and in a deep understanding and experience of the human condition, being able to engage all people, whether they are Christian or not.
This theological and philosophical idea that JP II has is unique because of its unique unitivity. It understands the principle that nothing is in the mind that is not previously perceived through the senses (a standard medieval principle and the basis of empiricism), while at the same time affirming that our empirical experiences are a mode of coming to experience something more then just the particular, but to grasp a universal. It unite empiricism and metaphysics in a proper classical method. It further unites subjectivity with objectivity.
I think the most important thing is that it affirms the idea of experience as the means of attaining knowledge, something almost every human person, I think, would agree with. However, it says that our personal experience is personal and unique to us, but that does not mean that it is not a personal and unique experience of something universal. It affirms that personal understanding of truth and says "a universal does exist, you have experienced from your indivuality, which is unique. You have experienced a universal in a unique way, thus adding to man's total understanding of that truth". In other words, it defends itself against the plague of relativism that is the result of a purely empirilistic world perspective.
-Harrison
He was stating that this is a topic he's going to spend time on because of a problem in engaging the idea of person nowadays.
He stated that, when discussing the distinction between man and animals, the ability to distinguish between man and animals is lessening with an alarming rate. Why is this happening? Because of an overly emphasized empiricism. For example, people say that apes can have a sense of the idea of beauty because they stare longer at a piece of art that is beautiful then one that is ugly. Therefore, they exhibit a human characteristic and thus are not so different really, and perhaps they are indeed persons.
My roomate was arguing that we have focused too much on the idea that man is a rational being, and it is the gift of reason that distinguishes him from animals. I was completely honest with him in that I didn't agree. The problem was not the idea of man being reasonable and something that has been taking by animal behaviourilists and applied to animals. Reason is that which defines the individual. But the problem is not on the individual level, but on the level of species.
One thing that is not discussed is man as a social animal. Perhaps there has been an over-emphasis on man's individual isolation from the rest of the animal kingdom. This is why it is important to affirm mans's social aspect. This is why God said it is "not good" for man to be alone on the 6th day. This is quite strong language, considering God is constantly saying "behold, it is good". The first statement of value is that God says it is "not good". That should really stick out to anyone who reads the Bible. God saw Man as not being complete and so created a partner fitting for Adam. Man became fulfilled by being a society of persons. Then God not only said that it was good, but that is was "very good". This again should leave us food for contemplation, because it is the only time in the creation narrative that God says "very good". Man is only fulfilled by being a society of persons. Man, on the species sense, is fundamentally different from the individuals. The individuals are individuated from animals because of their ability to reason, but also to be social in a society.
This, of course, is the theological position. To bring in Genesis to the public square on the nature of animals would probably not go over too well. And so, I propose a second problem, a flight from metaphysics.
People in the modern world have taken the idea of science too far to the point that all certainty is in that which we observe through our senses. They divorece it from any idea of a universal principle, form, or what not. When you divorce metaphysics from empiricism, you divorce your ability to make your case convincingly on a universal basis. Metaphysics discuss those universals from which we derive our particulars.
And this is why I think JP II's Theology of the Body and Philosophical Anthropology are the tool to this modern epidemic. One is a theological language, exclusive to the Christian discussion and affirmation of Man, while the other is a philosophical language, based in truth and in a deep understanding and experience of the human condition, being able to engage all people, whether they are Christian or not.
This theological and philosophical idea that JP II has is unique because of its unique unitivity. It understands the principle that nothing is in the mind that is not previously perceived through the senses (a standard medieval principle and the basis of empiricism), while at the same time affirming that our empirical experiences are a mode of coming to experience something more then just the particular, but to grasp a universal. It unite empiricism and metaphysics in a proper classical method. It further unites subjectivity with objectivity.
I think the most important thing is that it affirms the idea of experience as the means of attaining knowledge, something almost every human person, I think, would agree with. However, it says that our personal experience is personal and unique to us, but that does not mean that it is not a personal and unique experience of something universal. It affirms that personal understanding of truth and says "a universal does exist, you have experienced from your indivuality, which is unique. You have experienced a universal in a unique way, thus adding to man's total understanding of that truth". In other words, it defends itself against the plague of relativism that is the result of a purely empirilistic world perspective.
-Harrison
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